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REAL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AFTER FITZGERALD
Still Waiting for Godot 
Scott Prasser and Nicholas Aroney* 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry, although initially focused upon matters such as 
maladministration and corruption, placed significant emphasis on the 
reform of Queenslandʼs political and public administration system as a 
whole. It is therefore in relation to its practical impact within the 
context of that system that the Fitzgerald Report ought to be 
assesses. However, despite widespread support for the reportʼs 
recommendations, recent events in Queensland concerning such 
matters as corruption, maladministration, lobbying, cronyism and 
secrecy suggest that the report has failed to deliver on its most basic 
objectives. This article argues that although the Fitzgerald Report 
drew attention to and sought to address systemic problems of various 
kinds, it has largely failed in its intentions because the changes that it 
proposed could not be sustained in the context of Queenslandʼs 
existing constitutional framework and particular system of Westminster 
democracy, especially its high level of executive domination operating 
in the context of a unicameral parliament. The fact that so many of the 
Fitzgerald reforms were left to be sorted out by post-commission 
agencies working in such an environment means real reform has 
failed to flourish. Consequently, the Fitzgerald Report has met the 
same fate as so many other public inquiries into corruption in 
Australia, resulting in only minimal change to the way government is 
actually conducted. While as a result of the Fitzgerald Inquiry there 
has been widespread institutional restructuring in Queensland, the 
way of doing business in that state has hardly changed at all.  
Any Government may use its dominance in the Parliament and its control of 
public resources to stifle and neuter effective criticism by the Opposition. 
A Government can use its control of Parliament and public administration 
to manipulate, exploit and misinform the community, or to hide matters from 
it. 
— Fitzgerald Commission Report 
Mr Godot told me to tell you he won’t come this evening but surely 
tomorrow. 
— Waiting for Godot 
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It is 20 years since the tabling by Tony Fitzgerald QC of his Commission of Inquiry 
Report into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct.1 Given 
ongoing problems in Queensland highlighted recently by Tony Fitzgerald himself,2 
it is timely to consider how effective the Fitzgerald Report was in terms of its 
diagnosis, prescription and implementation. Recent events, such as the exposure of 
far-reaching networks between business and government, lobbying by former Labor 
ministers and the jailing of a former Beattie government minister for taking money 
from a coal-mining magnate, have heightened calls for another round of reform in 
Queensland.3 
There have long been indicators that all is not well in Queensland, despite the 
Fitzgerald Report. For instance, the 2005 Queensland Public Hospitals Commission 
of Inquiry into the employment of overseas doctors in Queensland hospitals 
revealed the extent to which ministers lied and used loopholes in freedom of 
information (FOI) laws to repress details about hospital waiting lists and serious 
complaints about medical practices within the hospitals, and how senior 
bureaucrats, with ministerial support, had sought to intimidate departmental staff 
wanting to complain about poor medical practices; it also highlighted the 
politicisation of the public service and poor administrative processes.4  
Other indicators of problems within Queensland’s system of government have 
included the low number of parliamentary sitting days, political pressure placed on 
Auditors-General to keep clear of certain topics, partisan appointments to sensitive 
senior public service positions, rushed legislation and a lack of consultation. These 
complaints have been persistent and reflect ongoing failures of democratic 
governance in Queensland over an extended period. Tony Fitzgerald’s recent 
assessment highlighted how little Queensland has changed since his 1989 report: 
Secrecy was re-established by sham claims that voluminous documents were 
‘Cabinet in confidence’. Access can now be purchased, patronage is 
dispensed, mates and supporters are appointed and retired politicians exploit 
their political connections … Neither side of politics is interested in these 
issues except for short term political advantage as each enjoys or plots for its 
turn at the privileges and opportunities which accompany power.5  
It is relevant to connect the discussion of these ongoing problems of governance 
and democracy to the Fitzgerald Inquiry for several reasons.  
First, it was the Fitzgerald Report itself that placed its investigation of 
corruption into the wider context of governance and democracy in Queensland as a 
                                                           
1  Hereafter, ‘Fitzgerald Report’. 
2  Courier-Mail, 29 July 2009.  
3  Editorial, ‘Changing a Culture’, The Australian, 18 August 2009. This is a concern to 
which the Queensland government has responded by issuing a Green Paper, Integrity 
and Accountability in Queensland (August 2009). For an analysis of the Green Paper, 
see Williams (2009). 
4  The Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry (‘Davies Royal 
Commission’). 
5  Courier-Mail, 29 July 2009. 
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whole. Fitzgerald surprised many when his inquiry, originally established to 
investigate police corruption, ventured into issues such as executive dominance, 
democratic accountability, public administration and electoral laws. Commissions 
of inquiry into corruption usually name names and detail who did what, when and 
how. They focus on particular individuals (eg members of parliament, public 
servants, members of the judiciary), certain aspects of government (eg police, 
prisons, hospitals) or on particular types of activities (eg drug trafficking, gambling, 
abortion, organised crime).6 Instead, the Fitzgerald Report concentrated on the 
overall system of government. As the Fitzgerald Report stated:  
The main object of this report and its recommendations is to bring about 
improved structures and systems. The past misdeeds of individuals are of less 
concern, except as a basis for learning for the future.7  
And: 
This report endeavours to identify major problems. It refers to issues which 
show the need for the introduction of new structures and systems, and 
revision of the old ones, as the foundations of reform.8 
Because the Fitzgerald Report stressed that issues of governance were more 
important than naming names, it is in relation to its effectiveness in addressing 
these types of issues that its impact must be assessed. And it is in relation to these 
very issues that matters in Queensland seem to have gone so seriously astray in 
recent times.  
Certainly, at the time of its release, some were critical of the emphasis on 
governance and democracy in the Fitzgerald Report, along with its failure to deliver 
on its basic terms of reference in relation to corruption. As Brian Toohey pointed 
out: 
Fitzgerald heard serious allegations against politicians and senior police and 
managed to uncover pertinent documentation about certain financial 
transactions. He did not however, build upon this evidence to produce an 
overall picture of corruption, let alone provide findings about specific 
examples in the police force or the political and business spheres.9 
Toohey argued that wider issues of governance were not part of the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry’s terms of reference and that the inquiry did not take any evidence on these 
matters; hence the basis and quality of its proposals in this respect could be called 
into question.10 Others also warned that the Fitzgerald Report’s recommendations on 
government lacked precision: 
                                                           
6  See Prasser (2006), Appendix 2 and Appendix 10; Moffitt (1985). 
7  Fitzgerald (1989), p 8. 
8  Fitzgerald (1989), p 6. 
9  Toohey (1990), p 82. 
10 Toohey (1990), pp 86–87. 
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What throws into doubt the implementation of these proposals (about 
government and electoral reform) is not their controversy, but rather their 
lack of preciseness … the lack of preciseness in the Fitzgerald Report … will 
mean there will be considerable debate as to whether the Fitzgerald Report is 
being implemented or not … The Report is too wide ranging and open-
ended.11 
This brings us to a second reason why the effectiveness of the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry needs to be assessed in relation to these wider matters of democratic 
accountability and public administration to which the inquiry itself drew attention. 
The inquiry was different from other inquiries not only in that it did not detail 
instances of corruption, but also in how it framed its recommendations in relation to 
both corruption and government reform. Fitzgerald himself stressed that the ‘work 
started by this Commission [had] not been completed’ and that its real task was to 
‘found the process of reform’, emphasising that ‘much remains to be done’.12 
Fitzgerald’s solution was to propose the establishment of new bodies, in particular 
an Electoral and Administrative Reform Commission (EARC) and a Criminal 
Justice Commission (CJC), to carry on from where the inquiry had ended. These 
bodies would develop the more detailed recommendations for administrative, legal, 
parliamentary, police and justice reform that had been identified in the report. And 
it was this that made the Fitzgerald Report strikingly different. Fitzgerald even 
specified the way in which EARC and the CJC were to be established as 
independent bodies, how their members were to be appointed and their reporting 
processes to new parliamentary committees.13 Indeed, the report asserted that: 
The establishment of each of those bodies [EARC and the CJC] will provide 
a firm foundation for reform. It is those permanent bodies which will have 
the opportunity and the resources to continue the work of this Commission 
with respect to electoral, administrative and criminal justice reforms. These 
bodies and not this Inquiry will provide the appropriate forum for debate and 
determination of what specific reforms should be made.14 
Reform arrangements such as these left room for considerable debate as to 
whether the recommendations of these bodies reflected what Fitzgerald really 
envisaged and for governments to come into conflict with these new external 
agencies. Indeed, given the public nature and procedures of the new bodies, any 
such conflict was destined to be highly observable and the subject of extended 
commentary. Furthermore, given that so much of the reform agenda was left to 
EARC and the CJC to assess and develop meant that it was impossible for an 
incoming government to be able to know, let alone fully support, all the proposals 
that had yet to be developed. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new 
agencies were being grafted on to the existing system of government, condemned 
                                                           
11  Prasser (1990), p 113. 
12  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 13–14. 
13  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 145, 366. 
14  Fitzgerald (1989), p 14. 
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by the report as being the very root cause of Queensland’s corruption. Yet the 
Fitzgerald Report did not recommend any changes directed to the fundamental 
features of the system of government as a whole, changes that could — with the 
benefit of hindsight — have been the beginning of a really major reform of 
Queensland’s political system: root, trunk and branch. 
This article contends that the EARC and CJC models for pursuing ongoing 
reform, while distinguishing the Fitzgerald Report from other inquiries of this type, 
were also its elemental flaw. How would these two new bodies — which were 
supposed to be independent, accorded bipartisan support and adequately resourced 
— actually operate in a political environment dominated (as it was) by the 
executive government? In this context, there remained a basic shortcoming in the 
terms of reference of the EARC and the CJC: they did not have a mandate to 
question the fundamental structures of the Queensland political system — in 
particular, the far-reaching power of the Queensland government, in full control of 
all of the resources of the Queensland public service and responsible only to a 
single house of parliament over which it by definition held majority control. 
Although the Fitzgerald Report itself drew attention to executive domination of 
parliament as a root cause of the problems it identified, it did not recommend any 
specific changes to these fundamental features of the system before bodies such as 
the EARC and the CJC would begin to operate. The functions and powers of these 
bodies were limited and remained subject to government decisions about their 
composition, structure, resourcing, powers and fundamental objectives. While 
established by statute, a government with control over the parliament can make 
changes to them at will. While both bodies would indeed help to instigate 
significant reforms, the scope of those reforms would prove to be limited, as it 
would remain up to the executive government to decide what was acceptable and 
what was not.  
The strategy of leaving the reform agenda ultimately in the hands of the very 
system of government and public administration that the inquiry had condemned 
seems, with the benefit of hindsight, to have been somewhat naive. That the 
National Party government — under whose administration the problems of 
corruption and poor governance had occurred — lost office six months after the 
Fitzgerald Report was released was coincidental and possibly fortuitous for the 
success of the reform process. However, Fitzgerald could and should not have 
assumed this as a possible outcome. Nor should anyone have assumed that the new 
Labor administration which won office in December 1989, although it embraced the 
Fitzgerald reform agenda prior to the election for reasons of both political 
conviction and convenience, would not face the unavoidable problems and tensions 
associated with attempting to carry out the many specific proposals of the 
Fitzgerald Report and those yet to be developed by two new extra-legislative 
bodies.  
Finally, it is worth considering the impact of the Fitzgerald Report in terms of 
the particular form it took as a public inquiry. Failure to implement public inquiry 
recommendations is the major cause of dissatisfaction with such bodies.15 Justice 
Moffitt, who chaired a Royal Commission into corruption in New South Wales, 
                                                           
15  Bulmer (1983), p 441. 
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lamented that with most inquiry reports, ‘genuine decision and action … is 
postponed and often avoided altogether. General recommendations … [are] watered 
down … reports are pigeonholed.’16 Other chairs of similar inquiries have expressed 
similar complaints.17 By contrast, the Fitzgerald Inquiry has long been seen as a 
resounding success in terms of what it discovered, what it proposed and how its 
recommendations were implemented. By general consensus, it has been seen as a 
‘landmark’ inquiry. After all, Fitzgerald’s recommendations were accepted by all 
political parties without question at the time of the report’s release. The hapless 
Ahern government promised to accept all its recommendations ‘lock, stock and 
barrel’18 before even receiving the report! Implementing the Fitzgerald Report 
became the key election issue in the 1989 election.19 As Labor leader Wayne Goss 
stressed during his policy launch: 
The first commitment of myself and my team to the people of Queensland is 
that we will work to restore honesty and integrity to public life in 
Queensland. The starting point for rebuilding the integrity of our government 
and major institutions will be the implementation of the Fitzgerald reform 
process. In Parliament I pledged my commitment to implement Fitzgerald, 
and today I reaffirm that commitment.20 
Subsequent Premiers and governments have made similar declarations. 
However, recent events suggest that the Fitzgerald Inquiry may not have been as 
successful as has so often been proclaimed, both in terms of its focus and its impact. 
The question is not just why Queensland government seems to be failing, but 
whether it was ever really fixed in the first place.  
We suggest that it was not. We argue that the breadth and depth of the 
Fitzgerald vision was not matched by the proposed mechanisms for its 
implementation and that the potential for a yawning ‘gap’ between goals and 
outcomes was very significant. Our contention is that implementation of the wide-
ranging and fundamental reforms envisaged by Fitzgerald, partly because they were 
not always clearly articulated, required more than just the establishment of new 
agencies, processes and committees. Fitzgerald himself rightly warned that such 
institutional and process ‘innovations will be sterile and impotent if attitudes do not 
change’.21 We propose that the constitutional and political system of government on 
to which the reform mechanisms were grafted — the root causes of corruption 
which Fitzgerald identified — could not sustain any challenge to its existing 
underlying arrangements. Instead of holding up the Fitzgerald Commission as an 
exemplary inquiry that has achieved much, we suggest that its reforms have been 
more illusory than real. The Fitzgerald Report, we suggest, did not grapple with 
                                                           
16  Moffitt (1985), p 19. 
17  Woodward (1989); Costigan (1984). 
18  ‘Qld Government pledges back-up for Inquiry,’ Australian Financial Review, 5 July 
1988. 
19  See Whip et al (1991), p 80. 
20  Goss (1989), p 2. 
21  Fitzgerald (1989), p 358. 
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Queensland’s unique version of parliamentary responsible government and to 
confront how Westminster principles ought best to be applied to the realities of 
modern-day government generally, as well as Queensland’s unique political culture, 
shaped significantly by its unicameral legislature. 
Although many changes have been made to Queensland’s public 
administration, parliamentary procedures and electoral processes, the failure to 
address the constitutional framework in which these institutions operate has meant 
that democratic governance has hardly improved, regardless of which party has held 
office. The array of serious problems now coming to the surface can be traced in 
large measure, we say, to the fundamental problem that the executive government 
dominates Queensland’s unicameral parliament.22 We do not contend that executive 
control of parliament is not a problem in other Westminster systems. But we do say 
that the problem is especially acute in the Queensland context. Nor do we claim that 
the mere existence of a second chamber is a panacea. The track record of Australian 
upper houses presents a mixed picture.23 However, we do maintain that the existence 
of a democratically elected second chamber provides a vital opportunity for 
significantly improved parliamentary scrutiny of government and a check on its 
decision-making power.  
With this background in mind, the remainder of this article seeks to undertake 
a general review of what Fitzgerald said, how his recommendations were 
implemented and the institutional settings in which this occurred. Our principal 
objectives will be to: 
• identify the principles of government, and of constitutional and public 
sector reform that underpinned the Fitzgerald vision; 
• assess and categorise these proposals in relation to existing principles and 
values of Westminster government; 
• analyse the changes made in the name of Fitzgerald and compare these 
with the Fitzgerald vision and the practices of modern government, as well 
as Queensland’s particular constitutional and public administration 
settings, in part to assess whether these were used to manipulate political 
advantage; and 
• review Queensland’s present constitutional and public sector arrangements 
in relation to both overt and formal changes, and whether the spirit of 
democratic transformation and an ongoing climate of reform have been 
achieved.  
Fitzgeraldʼs Assessment  
In essence, Fitzgerald placed the problems of police corruption and inappropriate 
dealings between government and business into the wider ‘political context’ of 
Queensland’s system of government (Section 3 of the report). It was Fitzgerald’s 
contention that ‘problems with and deficiencies in vital institutions and processes 
were evident from indisputable evidence in the hearings’.24 However, as noted, the 
                                                           
22  See Aroney et al (2008); Aroney (2008). 
23  See Costar (2008); Macintyre and Williams (2008); Stone (2002, 2005, 2008).  
24  Fitzgerald (1989), p 5. 
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evidence about these matters marshalled by Fitzgerald was not conceptually related 
to the specific examples of corruption or maladministration uncovered by the 
inquiry. The Fitzgerald Report provided a critique of Queensland’s constitutional 
and political system as a whole, from a particular view of the ideals of Westminster 
democratic systems and Queensland’s apparent failure to adhere to these ideals. 
However, the relationship between the constitutional system and endemic 
corruption and maladministration was implied rather than clearly stated. There was 
no clear articulation of what the inquiry saw as the key elements of the Westminster 
system, ideally conceived. Rather, its discussion of the parliament, the executive, 
electoral laws, administrative review and administration left it to readers to draw 
their own conclusions about Fitzgerald’s take on the Westminster system. In only 
one short paragraph about the public service is there an attempt to describe the 
Westminster system in ideal terms, and even this is both rudimentary and qualified:  
The Westminster system of parliamentary democracy is based on the 
proposition that governments answerable to the people decide policy, and 
public servants implement it. There are conceptual and practical difficulties 
with this model, but it essentially states the basic constitutional position.25 
Little more is explained. The degree to which there are conceptual and practical 
difficulties with this model is not assessed. It is left to the reader to infer from the 
report’s specific criticisms of executive government, parliament and the electoral 
system the conception of an ideal Westminster system underlying the report’s often 
scathing observations.  
In summary, the Fitzgerald Report identified the following fundamental 
defects in Queensland’s system of government: 
• a weak parliamentary system, involving limited scrutiny of executive 
government, few sitting days, a limited parliamentary committee system26 
and a poorly resourced opposition that restricted democratic discourse;27 
• an unaccountable Cabinet and wider ministry in relation to individual 
ministerial actions and especially in the awarding of government 
contracts;28 
• excessive secrecy in government, maintained through the doctrines of 
Cabinet solidarity and collective responsibility and in the absence of FOI 
legislation;29 
• a biased electoral distribution system, particularly through the 
malapportionment of rural electoral districts;30  
• limited administrative review mechanisms, with existing bodies such as the 
Ombudsman unable to make up for the deficiencies;31 
                                                           
25  Fitzgerald (1989), p 129. 
26  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 123–24. 
27  Fitzgerald (1989), p 123. 
28  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 125–26. 
29  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 126–27. 
30  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 143–44. 
31  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 128–29. 
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• a politicised, non-independent and unreformed public service;32  
• cronyism, especially regarding appointments to government boards33 and 
even to judicial office;34 
• a culture of fear and silence within the public service, especially in the 
absence of whistleblower protections;35  
• inadequate financial processes, with the Auditor-General lacking power to 
undertake more wide-ranging reviews of government expenditure;36  
• recurrent conflicts of interest by ministers, exacerbated by a lack of a 
pecuniary interest registration and the practice of awarding government 
contracts in return for support and donations;37 
• propagation of government views by misuse of public funds for large-scale 
government media units and use of news management techniques;38  
• lack of adherence to the separation of powers doctrine between executive 
government, the judiciary and parliament — although this was discussed 
primarily in relation to the appointment of judges and administration of 
courts.39  
While the Fitzgerald Report drew attention to the inadequacies of the 
Westminster system as it operated in Queensland, many of these criticisms could be 
directed to the practical operation of other Westminster systems elsewhere in 
Australia — especially at a state level.40 Indeed, there was very little evidence 
considered by the inquiry that enabled Queensland’s problems to be compared with 
those of other states. How was Queensland’s public administration more inefficient 
than or different from other jurisdictions? What judicial and public service 
appointments were inappropriate? How does Queensland’s parliamentary 
performance differ from that of other states?  
Nor did the Fitzgerald Report, in its brief (one and half page or less) coverage 
of each of these issues, suggest any specific remedies. Instead, a list of 16 items 
concerning governance issues was referred to the EARC for future assessment.41 A 
similar list was outlined for the CJC in relation to criminal justice issues.42  
                                                           
32  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 129–34. 
33  Fitzgerald (1989), p 118. 
34  Fitzgerald (1989), p 133. 
35  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 133–34. 
36  Fitzgerald (1989), p 135. 
37  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 143, 148. 
38  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 141–42. 
39  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 133–35. 
40  Uhr and Wanna (2000). 
41  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 144–45. 
42  Fitzgerald (1989), pp 372–76. 
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Impact and assessment 
Parliament 
A weak legislature, Fitzgerald stressed, is a necessary requisite for a government 
seeking to attain and maintain control of the political process within a political 
community. The Fitzgerald Report observed: 
It is much less likely that a pattern of misconduct will occur in the 
Government’s public administration if the political processes of public debate 
and opposition are allowed to operate, and the objectives of the parliamentary 
system are honestly pursued.43 
However, the Fitzgerald Report recommended only very minimal reforms to the 
parliamentary process. Apart from the Report’s recommendation for the 
establishment of a Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee (PCJC) and a 
Parliamentary Electoral and Administrative Review Committee (PEARC), together 
with some rather minor procedural changes, fundamental reform to the parliament’s 
operating procedures and effectiveness has been limited.  
For instance, the Queensland parliament’s low number of sitting days has 
hardly changed. Annual average sitting days for parliament during the Goss Labor 
government between 1989 and 1996 was 50.1 days — more than under the 
Nationals from 1984–89 (average 43 days), but significantly less than during the 
period of joint National-Liberal government between 1970 and 1983 (average 58.2 
days). There has been little change since. As Janet Ransley recently concluded, 
‘parliament still meets relatively infrequently in Queensland and has had a declining 
legislative program’.44 Indeed, despite certain procedural changes — such as 
increased numbers of questions and more ministerial statements — Ransley 
assessed that ‘there is little evidence … of much real reform in practice, and any 
extra time is largely spent in political set pieces’.45  
The Fitzgerald Report saw the establishment of ‘a comprehensive system of 
parliamentary committees’ as a way to enhance parliament’s ability to monitor 
executive government.46 But such a system was never fully realised. The EARC’s 
recommendations for a range of five portfolio-based committees were modified by 
the government-dominated PEARC to a more limited, functional range of 
committees, together with a system of short-term estimates committees. While these 
changes were an improvement over the previous limited number of committees,47 
they have been criticised as a second-best outcome.48 Indeed, Queensland’s 
abolition of its upper house has even been seen by some as a reason why the 
                                                           
43  Fitzgerald (1989), p 123. 
44  Ransley (2008), p 252. 
45  Ransley (2008), p 252. 
46  Fitzgerald Report (1989), p 124. 
47 The Subordinate Legislation Committee had been established in 1975 and the Public 
Accounts Committee in 1988.  
48  Solomon (1993); Ransley (2008), pp 253–54. 
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committee system prior to the Fitzgerald Report was so poor. Former Labor 
Premier Wayne Goss candidly acknowledged years later: 
Until 1922 Queensland used parliamentary committees extensively in areas 
such as legislation, land transactions, sale of government assets and policy 
proposals with members of both the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative 
Council often working together on issues of concern. But with the abolition 
of the Upper House in March 1922 by a bold and visionary Labor 
Government came the demise of a comprehensive parliamentary committee 
system.49 
Moreover, reports by the new PCJC were often not debated in Parliament, nor 
was there any guarantee that the government would even respond to its proposals, 
as was the case with the PCJC report on the operations of the PCJC in relation to 
the CJC and parliament tabled in December 1991. As Peter Beattie, then chair of 
the PCJC, complained: ‘This divergence from the ideals of Fitzgerald is of 
concern.’50 Other newly introduced committees, such as the Estimates, Public 
Works and Scrutiny of Legislation Committees, have likewise been deemed to have 
had limited impact.51  
More recent calls for parliamentary committees have met with limited 
responses. The Beattie government (1998–2007) never established the 
parliamentary committee on health as suggested by Forster Review of Queensland 
Hospital Management conducted in 2005.52 Premier Bligh, on the eve of the first 
sitting of parliament following the 2009 election, announced a revamping of the 
parliamentary committees without any consultation with the opposition,53 hardly an 
instance of the kind of bipartisanship that Fitzgerald had envisaged for the 
committee system. 
Another key issue addressed by Fitzgerald concerned the inadequacy of 
resources provided for the opposition within parliament, such as staff, office space 
and equipment. The Fitzgerald Report noted that:  
[an] effective Opposition is … essential for the proper functioning of 
parliamentary democracy. Non-government party members must be provided 
with appropriate resources and detailed information to enable them to … 
criticise.54  
National Party and Coalition governments had given only limited resources to 
oppositions in order to minimise their effectiveness. In response to this abuse of 
power, the Fitzgerald Report recommended that the EARC review ‘the provision 
                                                           
49  Goss (2000), p 2. 
50  Beattie (1992a), pp 135–48. 
51  Ransley (2008), pp 253–57. 
52  Forster Review (2005), p. 337; see various comments on the Forster Review, Courier-
Mail, 1 October 2005. 
53  O’Brien (2009). 
54  Fitzgerald Report (1989), p 12. 
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non-government parliamentary members with appropriate resources’.
55 When the 
EARC reported on this matter, it concluded that the ‘number of support staff 
allocated to the Leaders of the Opposition parties fell far below those allocated to 
Ministers’,56 and recommended an increase in opposition staff numbers to 20 per 
cent of that allocated to government ministers. However, although supported by the 
PEARC, this recommendation was rejected by the Goss government on the grounds 
of costs and comparisons with other states.57  
Such incidents illustrate that, although the parliamentary committee system 
was indeed strengthened and improved as a result of the Fitzgerald Inquiry — 
resulting, for example, in an increased number of reports and recommendations — 
the committees have nonetheless remained peripheral to the formulation of 
government policy. After all, at their best committees can only reflect the makeup 
of the parliament — and in a unicameral system the government always has the 
numbers.  
Financial Administration 
Another perceived deficiency of Queensland government identified by Fitzgerald 
was poor financial processes combined with a weak Auditor-General who lacked 
adequate resources and whose reports ‘contained little by way of critical 
comment’.58 Here, as elsewhere, the executive government eluded proper external 
scrutiny. 
In response, the EARC proposed increasing the independence of the Auditor-
General by formally separating this function from the Queensland Public Service 
and the arrangements that governed it. In addition, the EARC suggested that a 
reorganised Auditor-General’s Office be responsible for evaluating the performance 
of government departments in meeting policy goals.59 However, these 
recommendations were rejected by the government, much to the chagrin of the 
Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants and the Institute of Internal 
Auditors, both of which saw this as a lost opportunity and concluded that the 
Auditor-General ‘will not be able to report wasteful and/or deficient use of public 
moneys’.60 Remarkably, when in 2003 the Auditor-General responded positively to 
an opposition request to monitor government expenditure on advertising in line 
with the Advertising Code of Conduct, he was publicly called to account for his 
actions by the Premier, who at the same time announced that the Department of 
Premier and Cabinet would be conducting a review of the Auditor-General’s Office. 
The result was a much-diminished review of government spending in this area.61 
Later, the Auditor-General was reported to have been admonished by Premier 
                                                           
55  Fitzgerald Report (1989), p 371. 
56  EARC (1991a), p 138. 
57  Courier-Mail, 11 November 1992. 
58  Fitzgerald (1989), p 135. 
59  EARC 1991(b). 
60  The Australian, 11 August 1992. 
61  ‘Auditor-General Probes Political Advert Claims’, Courier-Mail, 2 December 2003; 
Parnell (2004a). 
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Beattie and Deputy Premier Terry Mackenroth for talking to the media about 
special audit reports and was warned that such interactions with the media must be 
strictly limited in the future.62  
While there have been wrangles over the independence of Auditors-General in 
other jurisdictions,63 this does not diminish how this important watchdog of 
executive government has been kept on a tight leash in post-Fitzgerald Queensland. 
Recent changes to legislation to place the Auditor-General on a more independent 
footing64 are certainly welcome, but their effectiveness will have to monitored 
closely, given this history of executive government intimidation of the office.  
The Public Service  
A major aspect of the Fitzgerald reform agenda was fixing Queensland’s allegedly 
outdated, politicised, crony-dominated and consequently low-morale public 
bureaucracy.65 The Queensland Public Service, said the Fitzgerald Report, should be 
able to ‘provide independent, impartial, expert advice’ and to operate in an 
environment ‘without concern for the political or personal connections of the 
people and organisations affected by their decisions’.66 Such perceptions were 
hardly surprising, of course, given the long period of incumbency of non-Labor 
governments in Queensland. At the time of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, the Queensland 
Public Service had not experienced a change of government since 1957.  
However, despite stressing the need for an independent public service, the 
Fitzgerald Report provided no explicit examples of corruption or poor practices 
within the existing system. Nor did the Fitzgerald Report outline a clear framework 
for public service change, specific principles of operation, or the appropriate 
relationships it should have with executive government.67 Again, this was left to the 
EARC to assess further. Such a gap allowed any incoming government to interpret 
‘reform’ in this area in ways most advantageous to itself. This lack of precision and 
specificity in Fitzgerald’s recommendations again undermined their efficacy as 
initiators of effective reform.  
It must also be noted that one of the trends of administrative reform at state 
and federal levels in Australia during the 1980s was the desire by governments to 
fashion more ‘responsive’ public bureaucracies through the direct appointment of 
department heads, an increasing use of contracts for senior staff, the abolition of 
public service boards and an increase in lateral appointments to senior positions. 
The Fitzgerald Report provided the trigger and justification for these changes in 
Queensland, notwithstanding that the partisan opportunities this opened up were 
clearly contrary to the original intentions of the report. Opposition leader Wayne 
Goss certainly envisaged more widespread changes prior to gaining office, when he 
stressed that there was ‘considerable scope for further reform beyond the terms of 
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reference investigated by the Fitzgerald Commission’.68 Goss thereby hoped to 
‘complete the reform process’ through ‘a more thorough-going review of the 
structural and overall management of Queensland public sector’.69  
Foremost among these additional changes was the establishment of the Public 
Sector Management Commission (PSMC). This was not a recommendation of the 
Fitzgerald Report or of the EARC. The establishment of the commission was 
announced almost immediately after the change of government in 1989, and was 
portrayed by the Goss government as being in the spirit of Fitzgerald. Indeed, it was 
said that it would constitute a ‘Fitzgerald reform trilogy comprising of EARC, the 
CJC and now the PSMC’.70 That the PSMC was staffed by people from outside the 
Queensland Public Service and that most of the existing departmental heads were 
replaced by newcomers from outside Queensland, many of whom had Labor Party 
connections, hardly inspired confidence in the impartiality of the reform process. 
Professor Kenneth Wiltshire summed up the problem: 
Some of the most clearly identifiable Labor Party figures were appointed to 
various parts of Queensland's public administration … It is not difficult to 
understand why many aggrieved public servants have attempted to make a 
connection between the restructuring of the Public Service and the political 
allegiances of those overseeing it.71 
An EARC survey of public servants found in 1991 that 59 per cent of 
respondents believed cronyism was alive and well under the Goss government.72 
While there were some worthwhile improvements in public administration 
processes in Queensland, the public service has come under increasing political 
direction and centralised control. This complaint has not been limited to the Labor 
Party. Reports that the short-lived Borbidge Coalition government (1996–98) had a 
‘hit-list’ of public servants it wanted to dismiss hardly imbued confidence in the 
system.73 Later assessments by the Davies Royal Commission74 and others,75 and an 
outcry over the appointment of perceived partisans to sensitive public service 
roles,76 reinforced the conclusion that public service reform in Queensland as 
suggested by Fitzgerald has not been achieved.  
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Electoral Reform 
Electoral reform and the ending of Queensland’s malapportioned zonal electoral 
system was another area singled out by Fitzgerald as a matter for the EARC to 
address. Some have argued that the ‘gerrymander’ was a myth and that its 
advantage to the incumbent National Party was exaggerated.77 Nevertheless, the 
electoral system was earmarked for change and EARC in due course provided 
detailed analysis and presented viable options. Overall, the changes proposed were 
assessed as reasonable and fair, though including minor weightage.78 Importantly, in 
this crucial area the Goss government accepted the advice it was given, even though 
it did not exactly accord with Labor Party policy of one vote, one value. However, 
since then there have been other changes to electoral laws that have not had the 
benefit of the EARC process.  
Secrecy 
Secrecy and propaganda, said the Fitzgerald Report, ‘are major impediments to 
accountability’.79 Developing a modern FOI system was thus another area for the 
EARC to investigate. The EARC reported on this issue,80 and had most of its 
proposals endorsed by the PEARC. However, in a number of key areas (eg non-
exemption of government business enterprises and the limitation on government to 
exempt agencies from FOI legislation), the Goss government departed from the 
recommendations of the EARC Report. Later modifications, including increased 
charges, further restricted FOI legislation in Queensland, with the result that 
executive secrecy remained largely intact.81 Indeed, it took the Davies Royal 
Commission into health to expose the limitations of the FOI legislation — in 
particular, the rule that documents taken to Cabinet could be exempted from FOI 
access — a loophole that was used by Coalition and Labor governments to conceal 
from the public vital information about public hospital waiting lists and other 
matters.82 At least this problem finally appears to have been addressed through the 
2008 Solomon Review of the Information Act83 and the new Right to Information 
Act 2009.  
Media Manipulation 
The Fitzgerald Report was highly critical of the way National Party governments 
had manipulated the media through the misuse of government media units 
producing ‘politically motivated propaganda’ parading as ‘facts’ and public 
information.84 Others agreed.85 A subsequent EARC report86 found evidence of 
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journalists being rewarded and punished through the provision or denial of 
information from the Goss government. Under the Goss government, media units 
expanded in numbers and were ‘co-ordinated by a senior media adviser in the 
Premier’s Office’.87 As Grundy points out, the only change from the past in terms of 
media manipulation was that the Goss government was ‘better at it’ than its 
National Party predecessors.88 In response, the EARC proposed codes of conduct, 
the establishment of an Information Policy Board, better support for the opposition 
and guidelines for distribution of information by government agencies to counter 
these problems. While some of these proposals have been implemented, the 
Queensland government continues to operate large media units and has extensive 
monitoring arrangements. There has been no major reassessment of this issue since 
the EARC’s 1993 review. It is not part of the Bligh government’s Integrity and 
Accountability review.  
The Fate of the EARC 
Perhaps, at this juncture, it is appropriate to review the fate of the EARC. The 
EARC was widely seen to have done an exceptional job in reviewing and reporting 
on the myriad of complex issues referred to it by the parliament and earmarked by 
the Fitzgerald Report. As Professor Wiltshire commented: 
The EARC has been a model organisation in terms of administrative reform. 
It has been completely open in all of its work. It has been highly efficient, 
having processed just about all of the agenda which Fitzgerald laid down for 
it in only two years … All in all, the EARC has been a cornerstone of the 
reform process giving exceptional value for money to the citizens and 
taxpayers of Queensland, and one of the most successful innovations 
introduced into Westminster systems during the twentieth century.89 
Despite its success and strong support for it to continue, EARC was disbanded 
after only four years, even though some of its commissioners were initially 
appointed to five-year terms.90 As John Wanna has asked: ‘If EARC really was so 
successful, why then was it closed down?’91 By bringing to an end one of the prime 
mechanisms by which the Fitzgerald recommendations were being implemented, 
the entire Fitzgerald program seems to have become unstuck. Wanna summarises 
the situation: 
Within the Goss Government many breathed a sigh of relief as EARC was 
closed down; not because EARC had actually caused the Government serious 
problems, but because while it existed it was a potential source of conflict 
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and an independent avenue of policy advice separate from the conventional 
executive dominated process.92 
Fitzgerald may have given birth to the EARC but in the end it was the executive 
government which determined not only which of the EARC’s recommendations 
would be accepted, but also whether the EARC itself would continue to exist.  
Criminal Justice Reform 
While political priorities occasionally overrode Fitzgerald’s reform objectives in 
relation to parliament and public administration, this was even more common in 
relation to the CJC in its role as the state’s anti-corruption and police watchdog. 
Over time, conflict between the CJC and the government became commonplace, 
especially concerning such matters as the appointment of chairs, issues to be 
investigated, responses to report recommendations and levels of accountability.  
From the beginning, the incoming Goss Labor government had difficulty 
entrusting responsibility for the CJC’s operations to its inaugural chair, Sir Max 
Bingham, who had been appointed by the former government and had been a 
member of the Tasmanian Liberal Party. One Labor backbencher (Robert 
Schwarten) even publicly urged Sir Max to return to Tasmania.93  
In a number of areas, the Goss government rejected CJC proposals. For 
example, on the key issue of prostitution — one of the issues that had triggered the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry — Premier Goss pre-empted the CJC Report by declaring the 
government’s policy not to legalise prostitution before the CJC had completed its 
report or the PCJC had responded to the proposal. This, Sir Max Bingham pointed 
out at the time, was contrary to the spirit of the reform process.94 Indeed, the Goss 
government’s subsequent rejection of the CJC Report and its introduction of 
Australia’s most punitive anti-prostitution laws were seen by Terry O’Gorman, 
president of Queensland’s Civil Liberties Council, as opening up the potential for 
further corruption to occur.95 Other CJC reports found unacceptable by the 
government included those on poker machines and SP bookmakers. Such 
disagreements over policy are inevitable, but they had a tendency to undermine the 
CJC and highlighted flaws in the implementation of Fitzgerald’s vision. 
The CJC, with its independent powers of investigation, had the potential to 
embarrass any government in power. This was most clearly seen in 1992 when the 
CJC investigated MPs’ travel claims and found 54 government and opposition 
members, including 14 ministers, had been ‘rorting the system’.96 This led to the 
dismissal of two Labor ministers, including the then Police Minister, Terry 
Mackenroth.  
Quite early on, the CJC had its funding reduced — from $20 million in 
1990–91 to $17 million in 1991–92. This, said commentators at the time, was 
                                                           
92  Wanna (1994), p 163. 
93  Courier-Mail, 28 February 1991. 
94  Sydney Morning Herald, 30 November 1992. 
95  The Australian, 27 October 1992.  
96  CJC (1992). 
PRASSER AND ARONEY: REAL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AFTER FITZGERALD 613
‘hardly a strong commitment of resources to the fight against organised crime’.97 
Repeated calls by Sir Max for Premier Goss to publicly endorse the work of the 
CJC met with a lukewarm response.98 Sir Max himself highlighted these ongoing 
problems for the CJC in late October 1992, when he observed that he had not 
realised: 
How politically charged [the] job would be. I thought I'd be largely 
superintending the operation of the criminal justice system … in fact, we 
barely got around to that end of the thing.99  
Further underscoring the executive government’s antipathy to the CJC has 
been the way Sir Max Bingham’s successors have been appointed. The Fitzgerald 
Report stressed that appointments to this key position required full consultation 
with the opposition and that the PCJC as a bipartisan committee was to be the key 
vehicle for overseeing the process. However, this principle has been more honoured 
in the breach.100 Several new chairs have been announced prior to the selection 
process, with the opposition being ‘informed’ of, rather than consulted about, the 
replacement. In 1992, Sir Max Bingham observed: 
Politically, while current rhetoric dictates that each and every member of the 
Legislative Assembly will loudly proclaim his or her commitment to reform, 
the actual experience of the CJC suggests that the practical manifestations of 
reform are not so welcome after all. There has been progress, but economic 
difficulties and competing agendas have combined to lessen the impact of 
some of the Fitzgerald philosophy.101 
After his retirement, Sir Max recalled how several ministers had threatened 
both himself and other members of the CJC during its investigation into MPs’ travel 
rorts. As Sir Max put it, ‘almost daily there were messages from various political 
quarters that it would be a good idea if we were to all drop dead’.102  
Sir Max’s retirement in December 1992 did not, however, herald a new era of 
relations with government. On the third anniversary of his election as Premier, Mr 
Goss lamented that the actions of the CJC ‘were one of [the] biggest 
disappointments’103 of his first term. Subsequent events reinforced the perception 
that governments had a strong desire to see the CJC emasculated. For instance, 
ministerial responsibility for the CJC was downgraded following Labor’s re-
election in 1992, when the Attorney-General took over from the Premier as the 
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minister responsible for such matters. While acceptable given the nature of the 
portfolio, this was perhaps done too early in the reform process.  
Relations with subsequent CJC chairs continued to be strained. Robin O’Regan 
QC lamented after his retirement as chair of the CJC that: 
Law reform in Queensland had been ambushed by political opportunism … 
The Goss Government’s political agenda had overtaken the reform process 
initiated by anti-corruption commissioner, Tony Fitzgerald.104 
There continued to be wrangles over the roles and functions of the CJC. In 
1996, the Borbidge Coalition government mounted its own inquiry into the CJC 
following the CJC’s investigations into the 1995 pre-election arrangement entered 
into between the Coalition and the Queensland Police Union (the Connolly-Ryan 
Inquiry). Borbidge saw the CJC being chaired by those who ‘were politically 
active’ and usurping the parliamentary process.105 The inquiry was itself abandoned, 
however, when it was found by a court to have ostensible bias.106  
Further undermining of the Fitzgerald vision occurred under the second Beattie 
government, which in 2002 amalgamated the CJC and the then Crime Commission 
to form the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC). The new CMC no longer 
directly investigated many of the complaints against police and other public figures. 
Instead, such complaints were increasingly delegated to the relevant agencies.107 
Robert Needham, the present chair of the CMC, has also pointed out that ‘legal 
limitations’ have prevented the CMC from investigating misconduct by politicians 
and public servants more thoroughly.108 Others have seen these trends as reflecting a 
loss of zeal on the part of the CMC. As commentator Tony Koch concludes, the 
CMC as Queensland’s ‘feared watchdog was neutered … and remains in a castrated 
state’.109 
The difficult relations between successive governments and the CJC highlight 
the problems of grafting on to the Westminster system of government an external 
body with considerable powers to oversee executive government actions. Even for 
an administration that was new and committed to ‘reform’, like the Goss 
government, the existence of a body like the CJC posed complex challenges of 
management and adjustment. These problems were exacerbated in Queensland’s 
unicameral Westminster system, which provided no countervailing force to 
executive government dominance.  
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Conclusion 
The Fitzgerald Report was unique among inquiries of its kind in its attempt to relate 
the particular instances of corruption and maladministration that it uncovered to 
systemic problems in the wider system of government in which these particular 
instances occurred. The report was also notable for the way it recommended that 
new extra-parliamentary institutions such as the EARC and the CJC be given the 
tasks of undertaking further inquiries to identify specific measures to address the 
systemic problems in Queensland’s system of government that encouraged 
corruption and maladministration.  
However, the Fitzgerald Inquiry’s recommendations did not go far or deep 
enough. Although Fitzgerald recognised the capacity of Queensland governments to 
use their ‘dominance in the Parliament’ and their ‘control of public resources’ in 
order ‘to stifle and neuter effective criticism’,110 little if anything was proposed to 
counter the profound advantages of incumbency. Twenty years after Fitzgerald, it is 
still true that Queensland governments are able to use their ‘control of Parliament 
and public administration to manipulate, exploit and misinform the community, or 
to hide matters from it’.111 The EARC made great strides in its time, but was soon 
disbanded. FOI laws were introduced but undermined. The CJC and its successors 
have been in a state of constant tension with successive governments. Parliamentary 
practice has hardly changed and the public service seems to be more politicised than 
ever. Whistleblower protections have not entirely eliminated a culture of fear and 
intimidation within the public service, as the Davies Royal Commission 
demonstrated. And Queensland governments still show themselves to be 
unconscious heirs of a political culture in which the separation of powers is only 
dimly understood at best. 
This last point is well illustrated by the attitude the Queensland government 
has taken to proposed reforms to the state Constitution. In 2000, the Queensland 
Constitutional Review Commission recommended, among other things, that the 
Queensland Constitution be approved and adopted by the people of Queensland in a 
referendum.112 The objective of the commission was that this would provide a 
platform for constitutionally entrenching the state Constitution Act to place it 
beyond the immediate control of the government. The Commission recommended 
that the ‘principal elements of the State’s constitutional structure’ be amendable 
only by referendum and that the remaining text of the Constitution be amendable 
only through a special process involving a prescribed delay between the First and 
Second Readings of any Amendment Bill and a report on the Bill delivered by the 
LCARC.113 In response to a report on this proposal by the LCARC,114 however, the 
government decided not to accept the recommendation. One of the reasons given by 
the government was that constitutional entrenchment would ‘prevent a government 
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from moving quickly to make machinery-of-government amendments if required’.115 
Without any hint of embarrassment, the government referred to itself — the 
government — as needing to make these ‘machinery-of-government amendments’, 
overlooking the fact that it is the parliament, not the government, that has the 
legitimate power to make alterations to the Constitution. Indeed, the concern of the 
government that entrenchment would ‘prevent a government from moving quickly 
to make machinery-of-government amendments if required’ elided the very reason 
why constitutional provisions are entrenched — namely, in order to ensure that 
governments cannot move quickly to make what are presented as merely 
‘machinery-of-government amendments’, but which actually alter the fundamental 
balances and limitations of power preserved by the Constitution.116  
Essentially the same outlook was recently seen in the government’s response 
to submissions to its recent Integrity and Accountability Green Paper. Although the 
government received numerous submissions calling for the reintroduction of an 
upper house as a means of improving government accountability and strengthening 
the parliament, the government dismissed these submissions in a single paragraph, 
which concluded simply that ‘the Queensland Government will not be pursuing this 
option’.117 
The problem was — and remains — that Queensland’s political culture is 
fundamentally shaped by the capacity of the executive government to dominate the 
state’s unicameral parliament. Without an upper house, successive Queensland 
governments become used to controlling and manipulating parliament and lose 
virtually all sense of any separation between the two institutions. As a consequence, 
Queensland’s constitutional and political system has been unable to sustain the 
Fitzgerald mechanisms that were grafted on to it. Although the Fitzgerald Report 
ushered in many changes to Queensland’s public administration, parliamentary 
procedures and electoral processes, the failure to address the constitutional 
framework within which these institutions operate has meant that democratic 
governance has hardly improved, regardless of which party has held office. The 
array of serious problems now coming to the surface concerning corruption, 
political lobbying, special deals and conflicts of interest can be traced in large 
measure to the underlying problem that the executive government in Queensland 
dominates Queensland’s unicameral parliament. 
The re-establishment of a democratically elected upper house would be no 
immediate panacea, for the political culture in which these problems have thrived is 
well entrenched. In addition, as we have noted, the performance of Australia’s 
various upper houses presents a mixed picture. But an upper house that is not so 
easily controlled by governments would help to make them more responsible and 
accountable — through its own investigatory and inquisitive powers, as well as 
through its capacity to fortify and support the findings, recommendations and 
determinations of Queensland’s extra-parliamentary institutions. An upper house 
would give oppositions more opportunity to scrutinise and evaluate government 
proposals, thereby not only subjecting the government to closer examination but 
                                                           
115  Queensland Government (2004). 
116  See Aroney (2010). 
117  Queensland Government (2009), p 11. 
PRASSER AND ARONEY: REAL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AFTER FITZGERALD 617
also giving oppositions more opportunity to commend themselves to voters as 
viable alternative governments. As Tony Fitzgerald recently reminded us, long-term 
incumbency tests the resolve of a government to remain free of the taint of 
corruption, political manipulation and maladministration. And an upper house, as 
the evidence from the other Australian states seems to suggest, enables oppositions 
to challenge government incumbency more effectively.118  
There are inherent constraints on any commission of inquiry process, and the 
Fitzgerald Report is no exception. Public inquiries are appointed by and report to 
executive government. As temporary bodies, their impact is inevitably affected by 
the political environment within which they must operate, and their proposals are 
often overtaken by new pressures and unexpected events. It should come as no great 
surprise, then, that the Fitzgerald Report has achieved so little of substance, despite 
all of the procedural changes that it initiated. The political culture in Queensland 
has remained essentially the same, not least because the state’s constitutional and 
political framework has made it all too easy for executive governments supported 
and sustained by disciplined political parties to continue to sideline those aspects of 
the Fitzgerald agenda inimical to their interests. 
References
Fred Albietz (2005) ‘An Appointment Not Above the Law’, Courier-Mail, 16 March. 
Nicholas Aroney (2008) ‘Four Reasons for an Upper House’ 29(2) Adelaide Law Review 205. 
Nicholas Aroney (2010) ‘The People of Queensland and Their Constitution’, in Aladin Rahemtula and 
Michael White (eds), Queensland’s Constitution: Past, Present and Future, Queensland Supreme 
Court Library. 
Nicholas Aroney, Scott Prasser and John Nethercote (eds) (2008) Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The 
Upper House Solution? University of Western Australia Press. 
Australian Labor Party (1989) Return to Westminster: Public Service Reform Policy Under a Goss 
Government, ALP. 
Peter Beattie (1992a) ‘Parliamentary Committees and Reforms’, in Andrew Hede, Scott Prasser and 
Mark Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland, University of 
Queensland Press, pp 135–48.  
Peter Beattie (1992b) ‘A Reformist Party in Government: The Courage Needed for Reform’, The Denis 
Murphy Memorial Lecture, 14 November. 
Peter Beattie and Wendy Edmonds (1991) Joint Statement in Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee 
(PCJC) Report on Prostitution, Queensland Government Printer. 
Sir Max Bingham (1992) ‘Criminal Justice Commission: Performance Report’, in Andrew Hede, Scott 
Prasser and Mark Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland, University 
of Queensland Press, pp 99–109. 
Martin Bulmer (1983) ‘Increasing the Effectiveness of Royal Commissions: A Comment’ 61 Public 
Administration 436.  
Peter Coaldrake (1989) Working the System, University of Queensland Press. 
                                                           
118  Aroney (2008). 
618 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2009) VOL 18 NO 3 
Brian Costar (2008) ‘Reformed Bicameralism? The Victorian Legislative Council’, in Nicholas Aroney, 
Scott Prasser and John Nethercote (eds) (2008) Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The Upper House 
Solution? University of Western Australia Press, pp 196–211. 
Frank Costigan (1984) ‘Organised Crime in a Free Society’ 17 Australian Journal of Criminology 7. 
Criminal Justice Commission (1991) Annual Report: 1990–91, Queensland Government Printer. 
Criminal Justice Commission (1992) Report on an Investigation into Possible Misuse of Parliamentary 
Travel Entitlements by Members of the 1986–1989 Queensland Legislative Assembly, Queensland 
Government Printer. 
Geoffrey Davies (Chair) (2005) Report of the Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry, 
Queensland Government Printer.  
Walter De Maria (1999) ‘Democracy in Eclipse’, Courier-Mail, 5 January. 
Walter De Maria (2005) ‘Deliberately Kept in the Dark,’ Courier-Mail, 8 March. 
EARC (1990) Freedom of Information Report, Queensland Government Printer. 
EARC (1991a) Report on Review of Information and Resource Needs of Non-Government Members of 
the Queensland Legislative Assembly, Queensland Government Printer. 
EARC (1991b) Report on Review of Public Sector Auditing in Queensland, Queensland Government 
Printer. 
EARC (1991c) Code of Conduct for Public Officials, Issues Paper No 15, Queensland Government 
Printer. 
EARC (1992) Review of Government Media and Information Services, Issues Paper No 19, Queensland 
Government Printer. 
EARC (1993) Report of the Review of Government Media and Information Services, Queensland 
Government Printer. 
Gerald E (Tony) Fitzgerald (1989) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities 
and Associated Police Misconduct, (Fitzgerald Report), GoPrint. 
Peter Forster (2005) Queensland Health System Review, Queensland Government Printer. 
Warwick Funnell (1996) ‘Executive Encroachment on the Independence of the Commonwealth Auditor 
General’ 55 Australian Journal of Public Administration 109. 
Wayne Goss (1989) Labor Party Election Speech: The Only Change for the Better, 19 November.  
Wayne Goss (2000) ‘Parliamentary Committees in Queensland,’ paper presented to the Australasian 
Study of Parliament Group Annual Conference, Towards a Modern Committee System, pp 1–7.  
Chris Griffith (1992) ‘Games in Choosing CJC Head,’ Sun-Herald, 30 August. 
Chris Griffith and Ross Fitzgerald (1992) ‘Reform of the Criminal Justice System: An Assessment’, in 
Andrew Hede, Scott Prasser and Mark Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in 
Queensland, University of Queensland Press, pp 110–22. 
Bruce Grundy (1990) ‘Who Sets the News Agenda: The Turkeys or the Chooks?’ in Scott Prasser, Rae 
Wear and John Nethercote (eds) (1990), Corruption and Reform: The Fitzgerald Vision, University of 
Queensland Press, pp 27–36. 
Bruce Grundy (1992) ‘The Reform Process and the Media’, in Andrew Hede, Scott Prasser and Mark 
Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland, University of Queensland 
Press, pp 43–53. 
Tony Harris (1996) ‘The Auditor-General’s Last Stand’ 93 Canberra Bulletin of Public 
Administration 1. 
Andrew Hede, Scott Prasser and Mark Neylan (eds) (1992), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform 
in Queensland, University of Queensland Press. 
Andrew Hede (1993) ‘Managerial and Equity Reform of the Public Sector’, in Bron Stevens and John 
Wanna (eds), The Goss Government, Macmillan, pp 87–105. 
PRASSER AND ARONEY: REAL CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AFTER FITZGERALD 619
Colin Hughes (Chair) (2000) Report on the Possible Reform of and Changes to the Acts and Laws that 
Relate to the Queensland Constitution, Queensland Constitutional Review Commission. 
Cathy Job (1992) ‘A Journalist's View of Reform’, in Andrew Hede, Scott Prasser and Mark Neylan 
(eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 
pp 54–65. 
Michael Keating, John Wanna and Patrick Weller (eds) (2000) Institutions on the Edge: Capacity for 
Governance, Allen & Unwin. 
LCARC (2003) Review of the Queensland Constitutional Review Commission’s Recommendations 
Regarding Entrenchment of the Queensland Constitution (Report No 41), LCARC. 
Clement Macintyre and John Williams (2008) ‘The Embattled South Australian Legislative Council’, in 
Nicholas Aroney, Scott Prasser and John Nethercote (eds) (2008) Restraining Elective Dictatorship: 
The Upper House Solution? University of Western Australia Press, pp 212–26. 
Malcolm Mackerras (1990) ‘How Unfair is Queensland’s Electoral System’, in Scott Prasser, Rae Wear 
and John Nethercote (eds), Corruption and Reform: The Fitzgerald Vision, University of Queensland 
Press, pp 250–58. 
Malcolm Mackerras (1992) ‘Evaluation of the Electoral Reforms’, in Andrew Hede, Scott Prasser and 
Mark Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland, University of 
Queensland Press, pp 190–200. 
Athol Moffitt (1985) A Quarter to Midnight !"The Australian Crisis: Organised Crime and the Decline 
of the Institutions of State, Angus & Robertson. 
John Nethercote (1990) ‘Reform of the Bureaucracy: An Overview’, in Scott Prasser, Rae Wear and 
John Nethercote (eds), Corruption and Reform: The Fitzgerald Vision, University of Queensland 
Press, pp 212–19. 
Chris O'Brien (2009) ‘Opposition Raises Concern About Parliamentary Committees Overhaul’, ABC 
News, 20 May, www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/05/20/2575936.htm. 
Sean Parnell (2004a) ‘Lesson from State Election Ad Ruckus’, Courier-Mail, 3 July. 
Sean Parnell (2004b) ‘Beattie to Cut Auditor Media Talk’, Courier-Mail, 7 October. 
Scott Prasser (1990) ‘The Fate of Inquiries: Will Fitzgerald Be Different?’ in Scott Prasser, Rae Wear 
and John Nethercote (eds), Corruption and Reform: The Fitzgerald Vision, University of Queensland 
Press, pp 98–122. 
Scott Prasser (1992) ‘The Need for Reform in Queensland: So What Was the Problem?’ in Andrew 
Hede, Scott Prasser and Mark Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in 
Queensland, University of Queensland Press, pp 15–29. 
Scott Prasser (ed) (1994) Was EARC Worth It? University of Southern Queensland Press. 
Scott Prasser (2006) Royal Commissions and Public Inquiries in Australia, Lexis/Nexis. 
Scott Prasser, Rae Wear and John Nethercote (eds) (1990), Corruption and Reform: The Fitzgerald 
Vision, University of Queensland Press. 
Queensland Constitutional Review Commission (2000), Report on the Possible Reform of and Changes 
to the Acts and Laws that Relate to the Queensland Constitution, Queensland Constitutional Review 
Commission. 
Queensland Government (2004) Government Response to the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative 
Review Committee Report No. 41 (tabled 28 April 2004). 
Queensland Government (2009) Response to Integrity and Accountability in Queensland, November. 
Janet Ransley (1992) ‘Reform of Parliamentary Processes: An Assessment’, in Andrew Hede, Scott 
Prasser and Mark Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland, University 
of Queensland Press, pp 149–64. 
620 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2009) VOL 18 NO 3 
Janet Ransley (2008) ‘Illusions of Reform: Queensland’s Legislative Assembly Since Fitzgerald’, in 
Nicholas Aroney, Scott Prasser and John Nethercote (eds), Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The 
Upper House Solution? University of Western Australia Press, pp 248–61. 
F Robson (1992) ‘My Battles with the Smear Machine’, Sydney Morning Herald, Good Weekend 
Magazine, 5 December. 
Tom Sherman (1992) ‘Electoral and Administrative Review Commission and the Fitzgerald Legacy’, in 
Andrew Hede, Scott Prasser and Mark Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in 
Queensland, University of Queensland Press, pp 203–14. 
David Solomon (1993) ‘The Reform That Might Have Been’, Courier-Mail, 4 November. 
David Solomon (2003) ‘Burden of Secrecy Tips Scales of Justice’, Courier-Mail, 17 December. 
David Solomon (Chair) (2008) ‘The Right to Information: Reviewing Queensland’s Freedom of 
Information Act’, Report of the FOI Independent Review Panel, June, Queensland Government. 
Bron Stevens and John Wanna (eds) (1993) The Goss Government: Promise and Performance of Labor 
in Queensland, Macmillan. 
Bruce Stone (2002) ‘Bicameralism and Democracy: The Transformation of Australian State Upper 
Houses’ 37 Australian Journal of Political Science 267. 
Bruce Stone (2005) ‘Changing Roles, Changing Rules: Procedural Development and Difference in 
Australian State Upper Houses’ 40 Australian Journal of Political Science 33. 
Bruce Stone (2008) ‘State Upper Houses: Designing for Accountability’, in Nicholas Aroney, Scott 
Prasser and John Nethercote (eds), Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The Upper House Solution? 
University of Western Australia Press, pp 175–95. 
Brian Toohey (1989) ‘Fitzgerald: How the Process Came Unstuck’, in Scott Prasser, Rae Wear and John 
Nethercote (eds), Corruption and Reform: The Fitzgerald Vision, University of Queensland Press, 
pp 81–88.  
John Uhr and John Wanna (2000) ‘The Future Roles of Parliament’, in Michael Keating, John Wanna 
and Patrick Weller (eds), Institutions on the Edge: Capacity for Governance, Allen & Unwin, pp 10–
44.  
John Wanna (1993) ‘Managing the Politics: Parties, Factions, Parliament and Parliamentary 
Committees’, in Bron Stevens and John Wanna (eds), The Goss Government: Promise and 
Performance of Labor in Queensland, Macmillan, pp 51–64. 
John Wanna (1998) ‘Political Chronicle, Queensland, July to December 1997’ 44(2) Australian Journal 
of Politics and History 261. 
John Wanna (1994) ‘An Evaluation of its Achievement’, in Scott Prasser (ed), Was EARC Worth It? 
University of Southern Queensland Press, pp 160–68. 
Rosemary Whip and Colin Hughes (eds) (1991) Political Crossroads: The 1989 Queensland Election, 
University of Queensland Press. 
Rosemary Whip, John Western and David Gow (eds) (1991) ‘Election Issues’, in Rosemary Whip and 
Colin Hughes (eds), Political Crossroads: The 1989 Queensland Election, University of Queensland 
Press, pp 55–84. 
Paul Williams (2009) ‘Bligh Writes Her Own Test’, Courier-Mail, 18 August. 
Kenneth Wiltshire (1992) ‘Reform of the Bureaucracy: An Assessment’, in Andrew Hede, Scott Prasser 
and Mark Neylan (eds), Keeping Them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland, University of 
Queensland Press, pp 269–70. 
Kenneth Wiltshire (2006) ‘Politicisation of the Public Service—Have We Remained Frank and 
Fearless?’ Address to IPAA (Qld Division), 15 March. 
Peter Woodward (1989) ‘Too Hot to Handle’, The Australian, 18 March. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
